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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK SANDMAN, 
Applicant and Petitioner, 
vs. 
TRIUMPH GROUP and LIBERTY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Appellate Court Case No. 980110-CA 
Priority No. 7 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
46b-16(l). 
ISSUE 
Was the finding by the Administrative Law Judge that petitioner failed to report his injury 
to his employer/supervisor within 180 days of the injury as required by UTAH CODE 34A-2-
407(2) adequate when petitioner's supervisor testified that petitioner reported a work injury to 
him on the date of the injury? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An Agency's factual findings will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record. Johnson v. Department of Emp. Sec. 782 P.2d 965 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Whether findings are adequate is a legal question that requires no deference to 
the Commission. Adams v. Industrial Comm'n. 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (cited in 
Featherstone v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 877 P.2d 1251, 1253 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, the board's legal conclusions are given no deference, and a correction-of-error 
standard is applied. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n. 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-407(2) (See Addendum at page 12). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is before the Court on petition to review an order of the Board of Review of the 
Utah Labor Commission denying petitioner's workers' compensation benefits. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner claimed an industrial injury occurred on December 27,1994. Two separate 
hearings were held. The first was held on February 11,1997 in St. George, Utah and the second 
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was held via telephone on February 21, 1997 before the honorable Benjamin A. Sims, 
Administrative Law Judge of the Labor Commission of Utah. ("ALJ"). 
The ALJ found that petitioner had not notified his employer of his work related injury 
within 180 days as required by statute (see UTAH CODE 34A-2-407(2)). The decision of the ALJ 
was affirmed by the Board of Review of the Labor Commission. It is from that decision that 
petitioner appeals to this Court. 
III. DISPOSITION IN THE AGENCY 
The Board issued a final decision on January 30, 1998. The Board affirmed the decision 
of the ALJ denying petitioner workers compensation benefits. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 9, 1996, petitioner filed an Application for Hearing with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah claiming he was injured within the course of his employment with 
Defendant Quality Park Products, Inc.,1 on December 27, 1994 when he was moving a roll of 
paper to load on a machine. He claimed as a result he injured his back and neck. R 2. 
2. Al Kyker was petitioner's supervisor with Quality Park Products on December 27, 
1994. R 197. 
3. On direct examination Kyker testified that petitioner did not report an injury to him on 
December 27, 1994. R 199-200. 
At some point in the proceedings, Quality Park Products Inc. apparently changed its name to Triumph 
Group and is listed in the record under both names. For purposes of this appeal, they are believed to be synonymous. 
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4. However, on cross examination Kyker admitted that on December 27, 1994, petitioner 
approached him and told him " . . . that his back was bothering him and he had hurt it. And that 
he was going to the emergency of the Dixie Hospital." Kyker testified that he understood 
petitioner's remarks to mean that petitioner had aggravated his back on the job on December 27, 
1994. He also testified that petitioner only worked four or five hours on the date of the injury. R 
204-205. 
5. Even though he had reported his injury to Kyker, Kyker testified that petitioner 
requested that Kyker not file a report that he had been injured on the job. R 207. 
6. Kyker never filed a first report of injury on behalf of petitioner. R 201. 
7. On September 6, 1997, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order 
finding that petitioner did not notify his supervisor of his injury within 180 days of the accident. 
R172. 
8. On January 30, 1998, the Board of Review issued an Order Denying Motion for 
Review wherein it adopted the findings of the ALJ and affirmed the decision of the ALJ. R 190. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Al Kyker was petitioner's supervisor on December 27, 1994. Petitioner was injured on 
that date. After working four or five hours, petitioner told Kyker that he had injured his back on 
the job. He then went to Dixie Hospital. By telling his supervisor he was injured at work, 
petitioner satisfied the 180 notice requirement of Section 34A-2-407(2). It is irrelevant the notice 
was not in writing. The ALJ completely ignored Kyker's testimony that petitioner informed him 
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of the work injury and the ALJ's findings are insufficient to support the conclusion that petitioner 
never provided timely notice of injury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ORAL REPORT TO PETITIONER'S SUPERVISOR WAS SUFFICIENT TO MEET 
THE 180 DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT. 
Regarding the reporting of Industrial injuries, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-407 provides: 
(1) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out of and in the 
course of employment shall provide notification to the employee's 
employer promptly of the injury. If the employee is unable to 
provide notification, the employee's next-of-kin or attorney may 
provide notification of the injury to the employee's employer. 
(2) Any employee who fails to notify the employee's employer or 
the division within 180 days of an injury is barred for any claim of 
benefits arising from the injury. 
There is no requirement that notification of injury be in writing. For example, if an 
employee's supervisor sees the accident, the notice requirement is met. See, Hartford Accident 
& Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah 176, 228 P. 753 (1924); Salt Lake City v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 104 Utah 436, 140 P.2d 644 (1943). Also, if a self employed worker is 
injured, notice is deemed automatically given. State Ins. Fund v. Perkes. 672 P.2d 101 (Utah 
1983). Likewise, an employer's injury report, a physician's injury report or the mere payment of 
medical or disability benefits by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier satisfies the 
notice requirement. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-407(3). 
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In this situation, it is fairly clear that petitioner's supervisor was told of petitioner's 
injuries on the date of injury. On cross examination, petitioner's supervisor, Mr. Kyker testified 
as follows: 
Q: In response - you testified to an event that happened at Quality Park bark [sic] on 
December 27, 1994; is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you have a fairly good memory of what, what happened on that date? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: Is there any particular reason why you - that date sticks out in your mind? 
A: The reason was that Mark Sandman told me that he was going to emergency for his 
back. And it had been bothering him previously. And I asked him if he wanted me to report it as 
an injury and he said no, it wasn't that, that he was gonna go on his own. 
Q: On December 27, 1994? 
A: No. Several times previous to that and then on December 27th. 
Q: Well, let's talk about December 27, 1994. What did he tell you? 
A: He told me that he, that his back was bothering him and he had hurt it. And that he 
was going to the emergency of the Dixie Hospital. 
Q: Well, when he said that he had hurt his back, was he referring to hurting it on the job? 
A: Um, I believe he was referring to aggravating it. 
Q: Okay. So he told you that he had aggravated his back on the job on December 27, 
1994? 
A: Right, approximate. 
(Pause) 
THE COURT: Are we all still here? 
SPEAKERS UNKNOWN: Yeah. Yes. 
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MR. DYER: Okay, your Honor, I'm just thinking. 
Q: (By Mr. Dyer) And so he only worked four or five hours that day and then went to the 
emergency room? 
A: Yep, it was somewhere in there yes. 
MR. PRISBREY: I don't have anything further, your Honor. R 204-205. 
This admission by petitioner's supervisor is clearly sufficient to meet the requirements of the 
notice provision of the statute. 
II. THE FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
In the Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order, the ALJ found as follows: 
The supervisor to whom the petitioner should have submitted his 
initial report of work injury indicated that a report would have 
been filled out if the petitioner had told them that he had hurt 
himself on the job . . . Had the petitioner informed the supervisor, 
he would have been sent to personnel to fill out a notification of 
injury form. No such form exists. 
The supervisor was aware that the petitioner had previously 
existing back problems. The petitioner has complained to him 
regularly prior to the alleged accident about his back problems. 
The supervisor is certain that an industrial accident was not 
reported to him. No form was filled out and no injury was ever 
reported by petitioner. The petitioner had indicated to the 
supervisor that the problems did not relate to work. 
Thus, the evidence does not rise to a preponderance that the 
petitioner ever reported the back injury to his employer within 180 
days of December 27, 1994.. . . (Emphasis added). R 172. 
Since there was no report filed, the ALJ found that the 180 day notice requirement had 
not been met. This argument is not tenable. "An employer's failure to file a report of an 
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employee's accident and injury . . . may not provide a defense to a later claim on the ground that 
the claim was not timely filed." Mannes-Vale. Inc. v. Vale, 717 P.2d 709, 710 n.l (Utah 1986) 
(citing State Ins. Fund v. Perkes, 672 P.2d 101 (Utah 1983)); See also, Kennecott Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 740 P.2d 305 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In this situation, petitioner's supervisor testified that petitioner reported the injury to him 
and after discussion requested that the form not be filed. Regardless of petitioner's request, his 
supervisor had an obligation to file a first report of injury. Failure to do so could result in 
misdemeanor charges being filed pursuant to UTAH CODE § 34A-2-407(7). It was for reasons 
such as this that the Court in Mannes-Vale, Perkes and Kennecott, supra held that the employer 
could not avail itself of the 180 day notice defense for failure to file a first report of injury. The 
employer in this situation should not be able to avail itself of the defense either as Kyker failed to 
file a first report of injury when petitioner told him he had been injured on the job. 
Possibly the most troubling finding of the ALJ is that "the supervisor is certain that an 
industrial accident was not reported to him." (Emphasis added). R 172. Kyker's testimony is 
fairly clear that petitioner informed him of his work injury. The ALJ makes no mention of this 
admission in his Findings of Fact. The finding is clearly not based on substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of Kyker's testimony. 
Whether findings are adequate is a legal question that requires no deference to the 
Commission. Adams v. Industrial Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (cited in 
Featherstone v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 877 P.2d 1251, 1253 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In 
Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, the Court stated that it is "essential that the 
Commission make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that the critical subordinate factual 
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issues are focused on and resolved in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical and 
legal basis for the ultimate conclusions." 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986). 
The findings of fact in this case are certainly inadequate since they ignore an admission 
by petitioner's supervisor that an industrial injury was reported to him on the date of the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The ALJ's determination that petitioner failed to report his industrial injury to his 
employer within 180 days is contrary to the evidence. The omission of crucial testimony by 
petitioner's supervisor in the ALJ's findings of fact is critical. Petitioner respectfully requests the 
Court reverse the finding of the ALJ that petitioner did not give notice to his employer of his 
injury within 180 days and remand this case for a determination of benefits in accordance with 
the evidence produced at hearing. 
DATED this lst day of May 1998. 
Caron J. 1 
Attorney for Applicant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the lst day of May, 1998, a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
PETITIONER was mailed, postage prepaid, as follows: 
(1) original Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0230 (8) copies 
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Alan Hennebold 
Utah Labor Commission 
160 South 300 East, Third Floor 
Post Office Box 146610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 
Mr. Michael E. Dyer 
Dori K. Peterson 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1609 
Mr. Mark Sandman 
3970 Wine Sap Circle #232-8 
Apple Valley UT 84737 
ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16 (1997) 
Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency 
action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner 
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the 
appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in 
the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings 
are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or 
as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-407 
Reporting of industrial injuries -- Regulation of health care providers 
(1) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out of and in the course of employment shall provide notification to 
the employee's employer promptly of the injury. If the employee is unable to provide notification, the employee's 
next-of-kin or attorney may provide notification of the injury to the employee's employer. 
(2) Any employee who fails to notify the employee's employer or the division within 180 days of an injury is barred 
for any claim of benefits arising from the injury. 
(3) The following constitute notification of injury: 
(a) an employer's or physician's injury report filed with the division, 
employer, or insurance carrier; or 
(b) the payment of any medical or disability benefits by the employer or 
the employer's insurance carrier. 
(4) (a) In the form prescribed by the division, each employer shall file a report with the division of any: 
(i) work-related fatality; or 
(ii) work-related injury resulting in: 
(A) medical treatment; 
(B) loss of consciousness; 
(C) loss of work; 
(D) restriction of work; or 
(E) transfer to another job. 
(b) The employer shall file the report required by Subsection (4)(a) 
within seven days after: 
(i) the occurrence of a fatality or injury; 
(ii) the employer's first knowledge of the fatality or injury; or 
(iii) the employee's notification of the fatality or injury. 
(c) Each employer shall file a subsequent report with the division of any previously reported injury that later 
resulted in death. The subsequent report shall be filed with the division within seven days following: 
(i) the death; or 
(ii) the employer's first knowledge or notification of the death. 
(d) A report is not required for minor injuries, such as cuts or scratches that require first-aid treatment only, 
unless a treating physician files, or is required to file, the Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational 
Disease with the division. 
(5) Each employer shall provide the employee with: 
(a) a copy of the report submitted to the division; and 
(b) a statement, as prepared by the division, of the employee's rights and responsibilities related to the industrial 
injury. 
(6) Each employer shall maintain a record in a manner prescribed by the division of all: 
(a) work-related fatalities; or 
(b) work-related injuries resulting in: 
(i) medical treatment; 
(ii) loss of consciousness; 
(iii) loss of work; 
(iv) restriction of work; or 
(v) transfer to another job. 
(7) Any employer who refuses or neglects to make reports, to maintain records, or to file reports with the division as 
required by this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor and subject to citation under Section 34A-6-302 and a 
civil assessment as provided under Section 34A-6-307, unless the division finds that the employer has shown good 
cause for submitting a report later than required by this section. 
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(8) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (8)(c) all physicians, surgeons, and other health providers attending injured 
employees shall: 
(i) comply with all the rules, including the schedule of fees, for their services as adopted by the commission; 
and 
(ii) make reports to the division at any and all times as required as to the condition and treatment of an injured 
employee or as to any other matter concerning industrial cases they are treating. 
(b) A physician, as defined in Subsection 34A-2-111(2), who is associated with, employed by, or bills through a 
hospital is subject to Subsection (8)(a). 
(c) A hospital is not subject to the requirements of Subsection (8)(a). 
(d) The commission's schedule of fees may reasonably differentiate remuneration to be paid to providers of 
health services based on: 
(i) the severity of the employee's condition; 
(ii) the nature of the treatment necessary; and 
(iii) the facilities or equipment specially required to deliver that treatment. 
(e) Subsection (8) does not modify contracts with providers of health services relating to the pricing of goods 
and services existing on May 1, 1995. 
(f) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, a physician, surgeon, or other 
health provider may file with the Division of Adjudication an application for hearing to appeal a decision or final 
order to the extent it concerns the fees charged by the physician, surgeon, or other health provider in accordance 
with this section. 
(9) A copy of the physician's initial report shall be furnished to: 
(a) the division; 
(b) the employee; and 
(c) the employer or its insurance carrier. 
(10) Any physician, surgeon, or other health provider, excluding any hospital, who refuses or neglects to make any 
report or comply with this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor for each offense, unless the division finds that 
there is good cause for submitting a late report. 
(11) (a) Subject to appellate review under Section 34A-1-303, the commission has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine whether the treatment or services rendered to employees by physicians, surgeons, or other health 
providers are: 
(i) reasonably related to industrial injuries or occupational diseases; and 
(ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (1 l)(a), Subsection 34A-2-211(7), or Section 34A-2-212, a person may not 
maintain a cause of action in any forum within this state other than the commission for collection or payment of a 
physician's, surgeon's, or other health provider's billing for treatment or services that are compensable under this 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 35-1-97, enacted by L. 1990, ch. 69, § 5; 1994, ch. 224, § 11; 1995, ch. 308, § 1; renumbered 
by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 150; 1997, ch. 205, § 1; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 115. 
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